The status of "anthropomorphic" descriptions of animals in terms of intentions and emotions has been generally regarded as a prescriptive methodological concern. In contrast, in the study of human social psychology the nature of psychological descriptions of other people has been approached as a substantive empirical issue. Following this lead, the present study investigated the nature of people's descriptions of short videotaped episodes of animal behavior. The descriptions obtained were predominantly anthropomorphic and structured according to a limited set of "event units" whose psychological meaning was highly consistent across the observers. In common with many social psychologists we conclude that consistency of anthropomorphic description suggests that meaning is speci ed within the structure of behavior.
This paper is concerned with the anthropomorphic or psychological description of animals behavior.
Strictly speaking, however, "anthropomorphism" refers to a speci c and highly in uential theory (and associated method) of how psychological descriptions of other animal's are possible. This theory, developed by Clifford, Romanes, and Morgan, maintained that the sole way in which a person can attribute intentions to another animal (human or nonhuman)
is by an inference from his or her individual case. We most de nitely do not subscribe to this theory, at least as a general explanation of the understanding of others. For example, it could hardly explain how a vegetarian prey animal (such as a zebra) could ever catch on to the quite alien intentions of a carnivorous predator (such as a lion).
The place of anthropomorphic description in the scienti c study of animal behavior has been the subject of controversy for more than a century, and seems destined to remain so (Breland & Breland, 1966, p. 12; Kennedy, 1992; Mitchell, Thompson, & Miles, 1997; Skinner, 1974) . Over the years, however, there has been a growing reaction to the prohibition -wrongly attributed to Morgan (Costall, 1995) -against the psychological description of animal behavior. Psychological description is now widely accepted (Crist, 1999; Goodall, 1990; Grif n, 1983; Rollin, 1989; & Sanders, 1999 ). Yet the justi cation for this change has remained largely at the level of theory, such as the good argument that this prohibition runs counter to the Darwinian commitment to psychological continuity across species. But there is a lack of relevant empirical research. Indeed, the available evidence, supposedly demonstrating the unreliability of the psychological description of animal behavior, is itself suspect and often anecdotal, including Morgan's famous example of his terrier, Tony, opening the garden gate with his nose with apparent insight and intelligence. Some may object that Morgan made repeated and careful observations of his dog and should not be deemed anecdotal; however, the same may be said of many observations of animal trainers, farmers, and pet owners in general.
The question of making sense of the behavior of "others" is not speci c to non-human animals. The scienti c investigator encounters the same problem of difference -and hence enters into the realm of comparative psychologywhen dealing with children, the insane, "primitives," or indeed anyone who is not "an Englishman, of the same social grade as ourselves, of like tastes and habits of thought, educated under the same school system . . . though even here there must be slight individual differences" (Morgan, 1903, p. 41) .
So what have psychologists had to say on the topic of being anthropomorphic about people? In the standard textbooks, the topic arises in two separate places. The rst is in the introductory chapter setting out the scienti c credentials of the discipline, and here the topic is dealt with in the familiar way, as a prescriptive methodological issue: Psychological accounts of other people, the textbooks claim, are inevitably indirect and hence prone to error (Brehm & Kassin, 1996, p. 94; Hogg & Vaughan, 1995, p. 68; Lippa, 1994, p. 117) . The same issue also arises in the chapters on social psychology, yet here, it is treated as a substantive subject for empirical investigation: Just how accurate and consistent are people in describing other people? A long line of experimental research seemed to indicate that such descriptions are indeed largely inaccurate, but these studies, as is now widely acknowledged, were awed, having used static and highly simpli ed displays. There is however, an alternative approach, largely stemming from Gestalt psychology, which, while often using simpli ed displays, has attempted to capture or abstract the relevant spatio-temporal structures upon which person perception might be based (Berry & Springer, 1993; Heider & Simmel, 1944; Kassin, 1982; Massad, Hubbard, & Newtson, 1979; Springer, Meier & Berry, 1996; Runeson & Frykholm, 1983; Waseda, 1966) . These studies have demonstrated impressively high consistency among observers in the perception of other people's actions and intentions -, including deceptive intentions -, and, on this basis, have argued that such consistency must have a basis in the structure or form of actions and posture (Asch, 1952; Michotte, 1950; Newtson, 1990; Runeson, 1985) .
About This Study
Taking the lead from this empirical approach within human social psychology, the following study is an attempt to determine the incidence and consistency of people's psychological descriptions of the behavior of animals.
Curiously, there seems to be just one previous study in the literature on animal behavior that relates closely to our own. Hebb (1946) gave an account of a study he conducted at the Yerkes laboratories, in which he compared anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic descriptions of the behavior of chimpanzees. He claimed that "objective" descriptions failed to capture aspects of behavior captured in anthropomorphic descriptions critical to effective interaction with the chimpanzees. However, "with the use of frankly anthropomorphic concepts of emotion and attitude one could quickly and easily describe the peculiarities of the individual animals, and with this information a newcomer to the staff could handle the animals as he could not safely otherwise" (p. 88). Unfortunately, Hebb's own article provides just a few illustrative examples, but no systematic data about the anthropomorphic descriptions nor their consistency. Although there is a growing body of research on lay people's judgements of the plausibility of pre-prepared texts framed in anthropomorphic language describing animal behavior (Eddy, Gallup, & Povenilli, 1993; Mitchell & Hamm, 1997) , we know of no recent studies of how people describe actual examples of animal behavior they have just observed.
Our study is modelled on a classic study by Heider & Simmel (1944) demonstrating the immediacy and consistency of people's descriptions of social behavior. In their study, they constructed a simple cartoon lm of geometrical shapes (triangles and squares) in which they attempted to convey actions such as chasing, and emotions such as anger, in the way these shapes moved about. Despite the simplicity of the display, and the open-ended instructions merely to "write down what happened in the picture," observers not only described the movements in psychological terms, but also showed remarkable agreement in the meanings of these movements.
In our own study, we have used short video-recordings of the actual behavior of dogs in everyday settings, but with a similar aim: to determine the extent to which human observers use psychological descriptions of animal behavior and use such descriptions in a consistent way. Like other authors both for and against anthropomorphism, we de ne psychological/anthropomorphic descriptions largely by contrast, namely descriptions that go beyond mere movements. In our view, the actual nature of such descriptions should be a matter for empirical enquiry, as in the following study.
Method
Procedure Twenty-eight rst-year undergraduate students (modal age 18 years; 22 female and 6 male of whom 11 had lived at some time with a "pet" dog and 17 had not) were asked to view four videotaped interactions of dogs and their "owners," or caregivers. After viewing each episode twice, they were asked to write down "what you think is going on, focusing particularly on the dog."
No instructions were given as to form or content of the requested descriptions.
Two minutes were allowed for writing each account. Participants viewed the video episodes in groups of up to eight, but no conferring was allowed.
Video Episodes
The selected video episodes lasted from 15 to 50 seconds and were selected from lengthier videotapes. The dogs and owners who were videotaped were selected on the basis that they were known to one of the investigators. Owners were asked to make tapes of typical interactions between themselves and their pets. The major criterion for selection of the video episodes was that the owner and dog were interacting for a major portion of the episode. Four video episodes were included in the study: The rst episode showed a seated owner stroking his dog (referred to as "stroking episode" in the remainder of the paper); the second showed an owner eating with her dog at her feet (eating episode); the third showed a dog being teased and talked to by its owner (teasing episode); the fourth showed a dog with owner and the reaction of the dog to the owner leaving (leaving episode).
The purpose of the initial stage of analysis was to discover whether there was consistency in content and/or structure of the participants' accounts of the behavior they had observed. We used a parsing technique that was developed for textual analysis by Mandler & Johnson (1977) . Parsing in this context means the identi cation and classi cation of salient and recurrent elements in the descriptions provided by participants. The recurrent elements, which are termed event units, are thus identi able sub-episodes of behavior derived from the descriptions of an episode. An exhaustive list of event units within episodes was compiled for each video episode. For example, we identi ed the following set of event units from all the descriptions of the stroking episode: owner stroking dog #1; dog is relaxed #2; owner stops stroking the dog #3; dog raises paw to encourage further stroking #4; owner starts again #5; owner stops again #6; dog raises paw and head to encourage more attention #7 (see Figure 1) ; looks at owner to encourage the owner to stroke more #8; owner strokes again, gives in #9; dog enjoys being stroked #10.
An independent rater (using the event unit descriptions agreed by the investigators) then examined each participant's description of an episode to establish whether a particular event unit was present or absent. The range of agreement in the compiled tables of event units between the investigators and the independent rater ranged from 87% for the leaving episode to 91% for the stroking episode. Disagreements about the presence or absence of a unit in a particular account were resolved through an iterative process, although, in fact, most of the disagreements involved obvious oversights.
Almost all accounts could be accommodated within the event units identi ed.
A very small percentage, 3.8%, of the otherwise typical accounts occasionally contained unique and unclassi able units.
The descriptions corresponding to each event unit were classi ed as anthro- looking for what the owner is talking about"); units classi ed as mechanistic simply referred to movements of the animal devoid of meaning and purpose ("when the owner stops stroking, dog moves a paw and turns stomach toward the owner"). Classi cation into these categories by two independent raters was highly consistent; agreement across all four episodes was above 94%.
A further classi cation of the event units was then undertaken to establish whether participants were indeed attaching the same psychological meanings for the same event unit in either their anthropomorphic or "as if "
descriptions. Again the consistency between the two independent raters in this classi cation was high (98%).
Results and Discussion

Consistency of Description within Event Units
For the purposes of this paper the most important aspect of the results is the degree of consistency of the anthropomorphic descriptions of particular event units. Consider for example the descriptions used for event unit 4 from the stroking episode. Our own gloss for this event was "dog raises paw to encourage further stroking." Here we list all of the accounts obtained from the participants who referred to this event unit:
Anthropomorphic Descriptions
Dog prompted for more; Dog raised paw to encourage further stroking; Dog moves paw and moves slightly so the man will carry on stroking; The dog raised paw as if in protest;
The dog waved paw again as if wanting the person to continue;
Mechanistic Descriptions
When the owner stops stroking, dog moves paw and turns its stomach toward the owner.
Not only were anthropomorphic descriptions predominant but also identical meanings were attached to nearly all the anthropomorphic and "as if "
descriptions. In fact, there were few occasions where there was any inconsistency in content. A rare example of an anthropomorphic description of an event unit that deviates from the rest can be found in event unit 1 of the "person leaving" episode. We list typical examples of the description of the event unit followed by the anomalous description in italics. Our gloss for this event unit is "dog enjoying attention from owner.". From Tables 1-4 , it is clear that the number of non-anthropomorphic event units is small (7% of total). Furthermore there is no pattern to the distribution of non-anthropomorphic event units across or within episodes.
There was just a small number of accounts ( ve of the 112 descriptions) that differed qualitatively from the other accounts. These atypical accounts tended to provide an overall description without attention to detail such as, "Submission of the dog. Forming a loving relationship between handler and dog" from the stroking episode; such descriptions could not be classi ed into event units. 
Mechanistic 100%
(1) (6) 100% (6) 100% (10) 100% (7) 'As if' 100% (5) 100% (2) 100 (1) Mechanistic 100% (1) Statistical analysis (F = 1.21, p = .33) revealed no difference in the number of words used in units that were classed as anthropomorphic (mean 9.45), mech-anist (mean 10.16) or "as if " (mean 9.00). Thus, at least in relation to the present paradigm anthropomorphic description was not being used as a convenient shorthand.
Inclusion of Event Units in Descriptions
The analyses we have presented so far bear most directly on the purpose of our study. It was not the case however that observers included the full set of event units in their descriptions.
Participants tended to be restricted in their use of units (the mean number of units used in stroking episode was 4.25 out of a possible 10; the mean for eating episode was 2 out of possible 4; the mean for teasing episode was 1.78 out of a possible 5; the mean of leaving episode was 3 out of a possible 5)
which accounts for the low column totals in tables 1-4. There was no pattern to the inclusion or exclusion of event units by the participants. Despite variation in the number of event units used by participants, the essence of the episode was conserved, as in the following examples of the stroking episode, which we give verbatim:
The owned leant down and stroked his dog, when the owner stopped stroking, the dog raised its paw to encourage further stroking, which the owner did. Once the owner stopped again, the dog again raised its paw and lifted its head, looking directly at the owner to encourage further stroking, which it was obviously enjoying.
The dog moves his paw up to gain attention and stroking from the gentleman in the chair. The man strokes the dog.
In summary, participants varied greatly in the number and selection of event units in relation to any particular episode. Nevertheless, their reports drew upon a very de nite and limited set of event units.
The Effect of Dog Ownership
Details were recorded of whether participants had owned or lived with a dog. There was no signi cant effect of experience with pet dogs on the number of event units used (mean number of event units used by participants with experience of pet dogs = 2.99 and mean without experience = 2.97; F = .32, p = .575). Similarly there was no impact on usage of non-anthropomorphic language between the two groups (c2 = .67, p = .88). All the inconsistent event unit descriptions were from participants with no experience with pet dogs, however, the overall number of such units (three) is so small it is dif cult to know how to interpret this nding.
Conclusions
Whereas 'anthropomorphism' has largely been regarded as a methodological and prescriptive issue in the study of animal behavior, the present study has approached the status of how people describe animal behavior as substantive, empirical questions. There were four main ndings:
1. The descriptions provided by the observers of the video-recorded activities were predominantly psychological.
2. The descriptions drew upon a de nite and limited set of "event units."
3. There was remarkable agreement amongst participants in the meanings of the anthropomorphic descriptions they applied to any particular event unit.
4. No participant ever included all of the event units in their descriptions, nor was there any consistent pattern of which units were included or excluded depending on the extent of elaboration of the description, yet the "gist" of the episodes conveyed in the descriptions was nevertheless similar.
In short, the so-called "anthropomorphic" descriptions we obtained in our study were far from inconsistent between the observers. But what is the basis of such consistency? In the literature on human social psychology, the consistency of the perception of other people's behavior has been presented as prima facie evidence that there must be something in the structure of human actions and posture speci c to different intentions and emotions. On the basis of our ndings, we wish to make a similar claim about the structure of animal behavior: The consistency of the anthropomorphic descriptions we have obtained must be grounded in the structure of the animals' behavior. If this claim is true, however, it raises in turn yet another empirical question for further research: What precisely is it in the structure of human and animal activities that affords such remarkable consistency in the anthropomorphic description of those activities. 
